University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 47

Number 2

Article 7

5-1-2022

An Uncertain Middle Ground: Burford Abstention in Federal
Cannabis Contract Enforcement Actions
Nicolas L. Davis
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Davis, Nicolas L. (2022) "An Uncertain Middle Ground: Burford Abstention in Federal Cannabis Contract
Enforcement Actions," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 47: No. 2, Article 7.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

An Uncertain Middle Ground: Burford Abstention in Federal Cannabis Contract
Enforcement Actions
Cover Page Footnote
The author would like to thank Professor Dalindyebo Shabalala for his advice, guidance, counseling, and
assistance on the intricacies of federal contract enforcement. The author would also like to thank Joanna
Gisel for her editorial assistance as a comment editor throughout the writing process. Finally, the author
would like to thank the members of the University of Dayton Law Review Board and the author’s fellow
staff writers for providing balance, comfort, and stability during the 2020–21 academic year.

This comment is available in University of Dayton Law Review: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/7

AN UNCERTAIN MIDDLE GROUND:
BURFORD ABSTENTION IN FEDERAL CANNABIS
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Nicolas L. Davis*

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 315
II. HISTORY OF CANNABIS LEGALITY UNDER THE CSA ......................................... 317
A. Introduction of the Controlled Substances Act .................................. 317
B. Supremacy Clause, Legal Standing, and Separation of Powers ......... 319
III. FEDERAL COURT APPROACHES TO CANNABIS CONTRACT ADJUDICATION ....... 323
A. Non-Enforcement Through Strict Adherence to the Controlled
Substances Act ................................................................................... 324
i. Preemption and the Illegality Defense .......................................... 324
ii. Unclean Hands .............................................................................. 325
iii. Criticisms of the Strict Compliance Approach ............................. 327
B. Consideration of the Circumstances in Equity and Public Policy ...... 328
i. Weakness of the Illegality Defense ............................................... 328
ii. Preventing Unclean Hands ............................................................ 329
iii. Criticisms of the Nuanced Approach ............................................ 331
C. Abstention, Divesting Jurisdiction, and Remanding to State Courts . 331
i. Burford Abstention Reviewed ...................................................... 332
ii. Abstention in Big Sky .................................................................... 332
iii. Abstention in Left Coast Ventures ................................................ 333
D. Federal Courts Should Reject Jurisdiction to Secure Separation of
Powers, Supremacy of Federal Law, and the Nuances of Cannabis Law
................................................................................................... 335
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 337

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a small business owner in California operating
a cannabis dispensary. You have earned your state-required permit to run
your business, complied with the necessary zoning requirements to operate
the location, and sold only what the state commercially permits you.
You have been operating since 2016, the year when your state passed the
Adult Use of Marijuana Act, and your business profits have exceeded all
*
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expectations.1 The business is in a good position to continue turning a profit,
but you want to get out of the business because you feel comfortable with the
profits made. After advertising your business for sale, you have found
a company interested in purchasing it. This company operates out of
Washington, primarily as a tobacco supplier for the West Coast of the United
States, and they are interested in purchasing your business because of the
profitability of the industry. There are several meetings between you and the
executives of this other business, and you come to terms on an asset purchase
agreement. The contract looks great, and you are both happy.
Unfortunately, the other party fails to pay you what you are owed.
Wanting to get the money owed to you in the contract, you file a claim for
breach of contract against the company. However, they remove the case to
federal court on diversity grounds and move to have the case dismissed. They
argue that the case fails to present a claim upon which relief can be granted
because cannabis is still considered a Schedule I drug under the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”).2
Both you and the company were aware of this going into the sale, but
it did not seem like an issue since both companies operate where state laws
permit commercial cannabis transactions. The CSA had not been consistently
enforced in your state, so you did not expect that enforcing your contract with
the company would lead to such a complicated issue. You are now stuck in
limbo, with the federal court deciding whether to dismiss your case pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or enforce your contract pursuant
to state law and other policy considerations in violation of federal law.3
The above narrative paints the difficult picture that federal courts find
themselves in with respect to cannabis contracts. Under federal law, cannabis
is an illegal Schedule I substance; this means it is highly susceptible to abuse,
has no recognized medical benefits, and has insufficient safety guidelines for
medical use.4 Federal courts have an obligation to further the interests of the
United States through the enforcement of the Constitution and other federal
laws.5 State law, however, differs substantially from federal law, with many
states legalizing or decriminalizing the possession, use, and distribution of the
substance and allowing the commercialization of cannabis through licensure
or permit processes.6 States have identified public policy considerations
contradicting the CSA, with one state even codifying the enforcement of
cannabis contracts as good public policy.7 Given this federal-state conflict,
1

Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 64.
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10).
3
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
4
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).
5
See Federal Courts & the Public, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/
federal-courts-public (last visited May 20, 2022) [hereinafter U.S. Cts].
6
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.395; OR. REV. STAT. §475B.535; Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 64.
7
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-601.
2
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it is important to understand the considerations that federal courts must make
regarding the enforcement of cannabis contracts.
This Comment argues for federal court abstention from cannabis
contract enforcement actions to avoid disrupting the Separation of Powers and
allow more experienced state courts to adjudicate such matters. Part II of this
Comment will provide a history of cannabis legality under the CSA and
introduce the different approaches taken by federal courts in relation to
cannabis contracts. Part II will also analyze the difficulty posed by the federal
government’s non-enforcement of cannabis restrictions and why this creates
an uncertain playing field for businesses attempting to operate within the
bounds of the law.
Part III will then explore all three approaches to cannabis contract
enforcement in more detail, providing the pros and cons of each. Part III will
also explain how the Supremacy Clause and the doctrines of Illegality and
Separation of Powers are used in cannabis contract enforcement actions both
as justification for adherence to the CSA and as guideposts for obtaining
equity. Lastly, Part III will explain why the third option of Burford abstention
is the best approach for federal courts to utilize, given the inconsistency
between Congress’s stance on the CSA and Executive enforcement thereof.
This Comment will end with a brief conclusion and review of the major
discussion points.
II. HISTORY OF CANNABIS LEGALITY UNDER THE CSA
Before discussing the federal court approaches to cannabis contract
enforcement, it is important to frame the federal landscape for cannabis law
generally. This requires an understanding of the CSA’s provisions,
its legislative history, and the historical approach to enforcement from the
federal government. It is also important to understand how the structure of
federal and state laws interact to create an uncertain arena for judicial
intervention.
A. Introduction of the Controlled Substances Act
Cannabis was completely prohibited for use, possession, sale,
distribution, and cultivation in 1970 with the passage of the CSA.8
As a Schedule I substance, the restrictions on testing cannabis for scientific
and medical purposes are very strict.9 Debate was rife in the immediate
aftermath of the CSA’s passage and the establishment of the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, as Commission Chairman
Raymond Shafer recommended that cannabis possession be decriminalized
8

Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 100, 401, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242, 1260 (1970).
See DRUG POL’Y ALL. & MAPS, THE DEA: FOUR DECADES OF IMPEDING AND REJECTING SCIENCE
9–10 (2014) https://drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA-MAPS_DEA_Science_Final.pdf.
9
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in small amounts to discourage unnecessarily high criminal penalties for
fairly innocuous activity.10
The 1970s saw a shift in state cannabis laws, as scientific groups and
state legislatures advocated for increased research into the medical benefits
of cannabis for patients with serious medical conditions.11 For example,
New Mexico began to implement legislation permitting the issuance of
cannabis by the federal government to treat glaucoma and cancer patients.12
However, early state legislative efforts were often regarded as ineffective and
without legal justification due to the continued federal illegality of the
substance under the CSA.13
Several attempts were made to reevaluate cannabis’s status as
a Schedule 1 drug under the CSA, with each of these attempts failing to
produce any change.14 As of November 2020, cannabis is still considered
a Schedule 1 substance due to its hallucinogenic effects.15 This Schedule
prevents physicians from prescribing it to their patients, regardless of the
perceived benefits.16
Despite failures from both federal and state
governmental actors, support for medicinal cannabis rose in the 1990s.17
A successful push in California resulted in the passage of the Compassionate
Use Act of 1996, legalizing the medical use of cannabis in the state.18 Several
other initiatives were successful in the years following California’s efforts,
with many states legalizing or decriminalizing both medical and recreational
cannabis.19
Given the diverse array of opinions in the medical field regarding the
potential uses of cannabis in patient care, the question arose as to
whether physicians were able to prescribe cannabis to their patients.
The United States Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit answered this question
in Conant v. Walters, in which the court explained that physicians had the
right to recommend their patients use medical cannabis, but they did not have
the right to prescribe it.20 This decision was unsurprising, given that a ruling
permitting cannabis prescriptions would effectively circumvent the CSA’s
10
See Donald Scarinci, Marijuana Is Richard Nixon’s Fault?, OBSERVER (Nov. 21, 2012, 12:28 PM),
https://observer.com/2012/11/marijuana-is-richard-nixons-fault/.
11
See generally DRUG POL’Y ALL. & MAPS, supra note 9, at 6.
12
Alice O’Leary-Randall, Today Is the 40th Anniversary of America’s First Medical Marijuana Law,
CANNABISNOW (Feb. 21, 2018), https://cannabisnow.com/lynn-pierson-first-medical-marijuana-law/.
13
See generally State-By-State Medical Marijuana Laws: How to Remove the Threat of Arrest,
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/issues/medical-marijuana/state-by-state-medicalmarijuana-laws/ (Dec. 2016).
14
DRUG POL’Y ALL. & MAPS, supra note 9, at 6.
15
21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(23).
16
Brian J. Kenny & Charles V. Preuss, Pharmacy Prescription Requirements, NCBI,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538424/ (Sept. 27, 2021).
17
See generally DRUG POL’Y ALL. & MAPS, supra note 9, at 6–8.
18
See, e.g., CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (1996).
19
See generally MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, supra note 13.
20
See 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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scheduling of cannabis.21 If elected legislators had failed to alter cannabis’s
place within the CSA, then physicians would be given no power to do
the same.
Then, in 2009, the Department of Justice issued the Ogden Memo.22
This memorandum, named after and issued by Deputy Attorney General
David Ogden, advised federal prosecuting attorneys to only
initiate proceedings against medical cannabis providers who violated their
state laws or committed other federal crimes while engaged in their cannabis
dealings.23 This loosened the restrictions on state cannabis transactions, but
federal raids on state providers continued after the issuance of the memo just
as they had before.24 The Ogden Memo position was reaffirmed by
Deputy Attorney General James Cole in 2011 and again in 2013
with the issuance of the Cole Memoranda.25
Then, in 2014, the
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment was passed, prohibiting federal prosecution of
individuals engaged in the distribution of medical cannabis unless the
distributors violated state law.26 Again, this was all done while the CSA
classified cannabis as a Schedule I drug.27
B. Supremacy Clause, Legal Standing, and Separation of Powers
The primary stumbling block for states seeking to allow easier access
to cannabis is the Supremacy Clause, which provides that the United States
Constitution and federal law take precedence over state laws.28 If a state law
conflicts with federal law, then the Supremacy Clause holds that the federal

21

Id. at 632.
See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Investigations and Prosecutions
in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana to Selected U.S. Att’ys, (Oct. 19, 2009) (on file with
U.S. Dept. of Just.).
23
See id. at 2.
24
See DEA Continues to Raid California Medical Dispensaries, Despite Obama, DRUG POL’Y ALL.
(Feb. 4, 2009), https://drugpolicy.org/news/2009/02/dea-continues-raid-california-medical-marijuanadispensaries-despite-obama; Emilie Ritter, Federal agents raid Montana medical marijuana facilities,
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-montana-marijuana/federalagents-raid-montana-medical-marijuana-facilities-idUSTRE72E0O520110315.
25
See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Guidance Regarding the Ogden
Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use to U.S. Att’ys, (June 29, 2011)
(on file with U.S. Dept. of Just.). See generally Kyle Jaeger, James Cole Talks Jeff Sessions And Marijuana
Legalization, MARIJUANA MOMENT (July 11, 2018), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/james-cole-talksjeff-sessions-and-marijuana-legalization/.
26
See Tom Angell, Federal Medical Marijuana Amendment Author Dies At 79, MARIJUANA
MOMENT (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/federal-medical-marijuana-amendmentauthor-dies-79/; US House Votes to End Funding for Federal Medical Cannabis Enforcement, AMERICANS
FOR SAFE ACCESS (May 31, 2014), https://www.safeaccessnow.org/first_major_victory_in_the_fight_
to_end_federal_interference; Interpreting the renewed Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment: A loophole for
enforcement?, THOMPSON COBURN LLP (May 31, 2017), https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/
insights/blogs/tracking-cannabis/post/2017-05-31/interpreting-the-renewed-rohrabacher-farr-amendmenta-loophole-for-enforcement [hereinafter Thompson Coburn].
27
21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(23).
28
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
22
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law supersedes the state law, preventing it from going into effect.29 A major
area where the Supremacy Clause has been applied is in cases interpreting
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.30
Cannabis law was specifically targeted by the Commerce Clause
through the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, where the Court
determined Congress had the requisite authority to regulate the private
possession and use of medical cannabis as part of a structured set of
regulations regarding the substance.31
Prohibiting state-permitted
possession and use of the substance was a necessary part of the scheme of
federally-prohibited possession and use.32 This case and its implications for
cannabis contracts will be explored in-depth in Part III.
However, federal preemption has not stopped states from adopting
policies that permit the medicinal use of cannabis, decriminalize non-medical
possession and use, or legalize it altogether.33 Public perception has shifted
toward such decriminalization and legalization efforts, and the federal
government has been fairly lax on enforcing the CSA, suggesting state
legislatures have more leeway than before.34 If laws are on the books but are
not actively enforced, there is uncertainty as to whether they must be
followed.
This concept of unenforced laws relates to the idea of standing and
whether or not a party may actually bring a suit in the first place. Lawsuits
predicated on violations of laws that the state has not historically enforced
have been dismissed because the party bringing the suit lacked standing.35
This issue of standing has gone before the Supreme Court on numerous
occasions, with the decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner clarifying that
the concept of judicial ripeness—the presence of an actual case or
controversy—is central to the ability for a plaintiff to bring a suit to federal
courts.36 If the threat of prosecution for violating a law is high, then there is
a legitimate case or controversy that grants the complaining party the
necessary standing to bring a suit and seek a remedy.37
Standing is essential to claims in federal court relating to cannabis
contracts, just as it would be for any other issue. If the court does not
29
See Supremacy Clause, CORNELL LAW SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/supremacy_clause (June 2017).
30
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005).
31
See id. at 32.
32
Id. at 24–25.
33
See supra text accompanying note 6.
34
See Andrew Daniller, Two-thirds of Americans support marijuana legalization, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuanalegalization/; Joanna R. Lampe, The Controlled Substances Act (CSA): A Legal Overview for the
117th Congress, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 5 n.54 https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45948.pdf (Feb. 5, 2021).
35
See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
36
387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967).
37
Id. at 152–54.
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recognize that there is a case or controversy due to the lack of federal
enforcement of the CSA, then a party to a breach of contract may not have
standing to bring the issue to federal court. It would seem appealing then to
assume that prosecution and subsequent convictions under the CSA may be
a fiction due to the recent activities of federal administrative agencies and
executive branch officials. The Cole Memos and the Rohrabacher-Farr
Amendment indicate that there is substantial wiggle room for those persons
who adhered to the state regulations on cannabis, so it is questionable whether
there would be standing for persons who violated the CSA to actually bring
a suit.38
Despite the historical inconsistency, the federal government has
enforced the CSA through prosecution and federal raids of private businesses
engaged in the distribution of cannabis.39 Further, the CSA has not modified
cannabis’s status as a Schedule I drug throughout the fifty-year history of the
Act despite numerous attempts to do so.40 Therefore, the standing issue in
cannabis contract disputes is a modern advent stemming from lax
enforcement of cannabis prohibitions between 2009 and 2014, as outlined
above.41
The confusion has only grown during the Trump Administration. The
Department of Justice submitted new guidelines for companies interested in
researching cannabis to determine what, if any, health benefits exist through
particular uses of the substance.42 Prior to this request, however, former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Cole Memos on
non-enforcement of the CSA with respect to cannabis in an attempt to enforce
the CSA in full.43 Though Sessions is no longer in office, the rescission of
the Cole Memos gave cannabis law advocates cause for concern. Businesses
rely on consistent legal frameworks in order to operate with any sense of
confidence. That confidence is baseless if the federal government’s approach
to cannabis contract enforcement is established by malleable federal agency
position statements rather than enacted legislation.
An additional consideration that must be discussed with respect to the
role of federal courts in the arena of cannabis law and the CSA is the
38

Thompson Coburn, supra note 26.
See e.g., Megan Carpentier, Why Are Feds Targeting High-End Pot Producers in California?,
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 2, 2016, 3:36 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/why-arefeds-targeting-high-end-pot-producers-in-california-124701/.
40
See generally DRUG POL’Y ALL. & MAPS, supra note 9.
41
See supra text accompanying notes 22–27.
42
See generally Controls to Enhance the Cultivation of Marihuana Research in the United States,
85 Fed. Reg. 16292 (proposed Mar. 23, 2020) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1301 and 21 C.F.R. 1318).
43
See Tom Angell, Sessions Rescinds Memo On State Marijuana Laws, MARIJUANA MOMENT
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/sessions-rescind-memo-state-marijuana-laws/;
John Hudak, Why Sessions is wrong to reverse federal marijuana policy, BROOKINGS (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/01/04/why-sessions-is-wrong-to-reverse-federal-marijuanapolicy/.
39
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Separation of Powers doctrine.44 This doctrine is fundamental to the
governance of the United States, as it provides that the powers of enacting,
enforcing, and interpreting law are separated into three distinct but related
branches of government: Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary,
respectively.45 The issue of cannabis law has to do with all three branches of
government, and there is substantial danger that the Separation of Powers
doctrine will be disrupted and the balance of powers thrown into disarray
depending on the actions of each branch.
Congress’s position seems to be rather clear: the CSA was passed
with the intent to criminalize the use, possession, and distribution of cannabis
due to it having no medical value.46 The lack of any movement on
rescheduling the substance or removing it from the CSA altogether indicates
that this intent controls. The current status of the law controls and cannabis
continues to be illegal. Based on this position, the Executive is supposed to
carry out enforcement and prosecution under the CSA by arresting and
charging individuals who violate the law, though there is some discretion with
how they approach this responsibility.47 As explained above, however, the
enforcement role does not prevent administrative agencies such as the
Department of Justice from proposing new regulations on research into
medical uses of cannabis.48 Nor does it prevent them from taking a lax
position on that enforcement obligation.49
Lastly, the judiciary has the responsibility of ensuring that justice is
meted out with respect to violations of the CSA, applying the law to cases that
come before them.50 The threat of disruption to the Separation of Powers is
strongest from the judiciary since the courts must consider relevant action or
inaction on the part of Congress and the Executive to determine whether and
how to proceed with cases. If the judiciary interprets, for example, the
inclusion of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment in the annual budget and
spending bills to be an indication that Congress is less concerned with
cannabis law violations, then they may not strictly apply the CSA. If the
Executive branch is not willing to enforce the CSA because they want to
provide deference to state laws, the judiciary could enforce contracts that
comply with state laws despite their conflict with federal law. This judicial
freedom threatens the Separation of Powers because a court may make
a ruling on a case that conflicts directly with Congress’s position on the letter
44
See generally Nat Stern, Separation of Powers, Executive Authority, and Suspension of Disbelief,
54 HOUS. L. REV. 125 (2016).
45
Id. at 127.
46
See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10).
47
See Todd Garvey, Medical Marijuana: The Supremacy Clause, Federalism, and the Interplay
Between State and Federal Laws, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 1, 15 (Nov. 9, 2012), https://sgp.fas.org/
crs/misc/R42398.pdf.
48
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49
See Thompson Coburn, supra note 26.
50
Garvey, supra note 47, at 15–16.
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of the CSA while remaining consistent with the Executive’s position on the
spirit of enforcement. On the other hand, a court may make a ruling that is
consistent with the CSA but inconsistent with enforcement efforts.
That balance is difficult to strike when the approaches appear to contradict
one another.
III. FEDERAL COURT APPROACHES TO CANNABIS CONTRACT
ADJUDICATION
Cannabis law in the United States has seen a dramatic shift from strict
enforcement of the CSA to a nuanced analysis of state laws and public
policy.51 Nowhere is this shift more prevalent than in the realm of cannabis
contract law. State courts generally have an easy time with disputes involving
cannabis contracts since their state legislatures have codified public policy
encouraging the enforcement of these contracts.52 However, the continuing
federal prohibition of cannabis under the CSA has led some courts to quick
resolutions of contract disputes on the basis of illegality.53
District courts have continued to declare cannabis contracts
unenforceable because they involve interests in a substance that is illegal
under the CSA.54 This ‘strict compliance’ approach is consistent with the
federal courts’ role in enforcing federal laws.55 Other federal courts have
employed a nuanced approach, enforcing cannabis contracts so long as
enforcement does not require or allow a party to acquire an interest in the
growth, sale, possession, or distribution of cannabis.56 A less common but
nonetheless available approach—and the one advocated by this Comment—
is to abstain from a case and push it back to a state court with valid
jurisdiction. By considering the interests of the federal and state
governments, law enforcement officials, attorneys, and businesses, this third
approach represents a safe “middle ground” by which federal courts can avoid
butting heads with conflicting laws.
Recent enforcement of the CSA with respect to cannabis has led to
uncertainty as to how federal courts should approach cannabis contracts.
As explained above, federal courts considering whether to enforce cannabis
contracts generally look to one of three options for adjudication: (1) the strict

51
See generally Blake Marvis, Comment, Reefer Madness in Federal Court: An Overview of How
Federal Courts are Dealing with Cannabis Litigation and Why it is Necessary to “Dig into the Weeds,”
23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 967 (2019).
52
See supra text accompanying note 6.
53
See, e.g., Tracy v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-00487, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35913, at *39
(D. Haw. Mar. 16, 2012); Polk v. Gontmakher, No. 2:18-cv-01434, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146724, at *8
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2019); Bart St., III v. ACC Enters., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00083, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58003, at *28 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2020).
54
Marvis, supra note 51, at 982–83.
55
U.S. CTS., supra note 5.
56
Marvis, supra note 51, at 988–91.
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compliance approach, (2) the nuanced approach, and (3) the abstention
approach.57
The first option is to strictly adhere to the CSA and rule that
enforcement would be contrary to federal law under the Supremacy Clause,
the Separation of Powers doctrine, and the Illegality doctrine. The second
would be to consider the circumstances of the contract in light of the equitable
outcomes possible from either enforcement or non-enforcement and to issue
a decision on enforcement based on public policy. The third option is to
abstain from the case and remand the issue back to a state court that has proper
jurisdiction over the matter. Legal commentators and law journals have
discussed the first two approaches at length.58 However, the third approach
is not often brought up in the context of cannabis contracts—at least, not until
recently. The abstention approach, while less popular than the strict
compliance or nuanced approaches, is more consistent with the legislative
intent of the CSA, the Supremacy Clause, the Separation of powers doctrine,
and the Executive Branch’s administrative agencies’ nuanced approach
to enforcement. As a result, the abstention approach ought to be followed by
federal courts. To understand why this is the case, it is important to
understand the pros and cons of each approach and consider how and why
they have been applied.
A. Non-Enforcement Through Strict Adherence to the Controlled
Substances Act
One approach is for courts to adopt strict adherence to the CSA and
not enforce cannabis contracts. This would give deference to the CSA’s
scheduling of cannabis, safeguard the illegality defense to contract
enforcement, provide predictability for federal courts, and ignore the
difficulty posed by the inconsistency in federal enforcement efforts. The
primary justification for this approach comes down to the role of the federal
courts in enforcing federal, rather than state, laws.59 So long as cannabis is
illegal under the CSA, federal courts have an obligation not to enforce
cannabis contracts in violation of the CSA.60
i.

Preemption and the Illegality Defense

The decision in Gonzales v. Raich dealt with issues surrounding
congressional power to regulate state law under the auspices of the Commerce
Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and preemption.61 In deciding Raich, the
Supreme Court held that Congress may regulate private possession and use of
57
58
59
60
61

See supra text accompanying notes 51–56.
See, e.g., Marvis, supra note 51, at 978–1000.
Id. at 978–79.
See U.S. CTS., supra note 5.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15, 29 (2005).
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medicinal cannabis otherwise permitted under state law which is incidental to
a legitimate government interest in halting the illegal drug trade.62 When
Congress passed the CSA, they did so with an interest in stopping those who
would engage in interstate drug trafficking.63 Plaintiffs in Raich argued that
this interest was not being obstructed by the state of California passing its
own law allowing the private use and growing of cannabis plants within a
medical context.64 The Supreme Court rejected this argument because the
private use, possession, distribution, and cultivation of a substance prohibited
under federal law was central to the enforceability of that law, regardless of
medicinal purpose.65 The Raich decision on medical cannabis laws seems to
guide the disposition of cannabis contract enforcement actions. If state
statutes permit the enforcement of cannabis contracts in violation of the CSA,
then it would be assumed that the CSA would preempt that state statute and
preclude enforcement of the contract and the statute.
The decision in Raich was a major guidepost for lower federal courts
to rule cannabis contracts unenforceable due to the illegality of the subject
matter involved. In Tracy v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii ruled that an insurance contract
covering damage to cannabis plants was unenforceable.66 The court ruled that
enforcing the insurance contract would violate federal law because of the
illegality of the plants at the center of the insurance claim.67 Although the
plants were insurable property under the policy, enforcement of this insurance
contract would result in the provider paying money to the policyholder for
damage to cannabis plants which the policyholder was prohibited from
possessing under federal law.68 The District Court for the Western District of
Washington passed down a similar decision in the case of Polk v.
Gontmakher, where the court ruled that it would be a violation of the CSA to
award damages in the form of ownership and a share of profits in a company
that produces cannabis.69 The recency of these decisions indicates the strict
compliance approach continues to be justified by both the Illegality doctrine
and the principle of preemption even as states pass laws to the contrary.
ii. Unclean Hands
The Unclean Hands doctrine is an affirmative defense available to
parties seeking to avoid liability to a plaintiff by appealing to the plaintiff’s
62

Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 10.
64
Id. at 30.
65
Id. at 27–28.
66
Tracy v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-00487, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35913, at *39 (D. Haw.
Mar. 16, 2012).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Polk v. Gontmakher, No. 2:18-cv-01434, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146724, at *5–6 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 28, 2019).
63
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own bad or inequitable behavior.70 It originates from the philosophical view
that a party seeking equity should not be able to recover if they engage in
inequity.71 The concept of “unclean hands” was central to the determination
by the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in Bart St., III
v. ACC Enters., LLC.72 The Plaintiff there argued that Defendants breached
a loan contract funding the expansion of their cannabis cultivation business.73
The District Court for the District of Nevada first discussed how the loan
contract could not be enforced because select terms in the contract allowed a
company to develop an interest in cannabis cultivation businesses in
contravention of the CSA.74 Specifically, the District Court found that the
right of first refusal provision in the contract allowed Plaintiff to acquire
profits from the sale of cannabis, and the operating capital terms provision
provided direct financial assistance to Defendants for the cultivation of their
cannabis business.75
Plaintiff argued that these provisions were severable under the
contract, thus allowing the contract to continue to operate without violating
the CSA.76 The court disagreed, finding that the two clauses may have been
central to the existence of the loan.77 Because the court could not decide on
whether the unlawful provisions were collateral or central, they did not make
a ruling on that issue.78 However, the court did determine that Plaintiff was
unable to prevail under the theory of unjust enrichment because they had to
first determine that the contract was illegal and incapable of severance, then
determine that Bart St. III, LLC, had clean hands in the arrangement.79 If the
contract was ruled to be unenforceable, it was because Bart St. III, LLC,
entered into the agreement with the intent of developing an interest in the
cultivation of a cannabis business in violation of the CSA.80
Since the conspiracy to cultivate cannabis constituted a crime of
“moral turpitude,” the court found that Bart St. III, LLC, could not recover
under unjust enrichment because they had unclean hands in the dealing of
illegal contracts.81 The court explained that “[i]t is irrelevant that the Nevada
legislature ‘legalized’ marijuana because marijuana is illegal under federal
law, and the CSA preempts Nevada law under the Constitution’s Supremacy
70

Marvis, supra note 51, at 982.
See T. Leigh Anenson, Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1827,
1843–44 (2018).
72
Bart St., III v. ACC Enters., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00083, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58003, at *24–26
(D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2020).
73
Id. at *2.
74
Id. at *17–18.
75
Id. at *6.
76
Id. at *11.
77
Id. at *24.
78
Id. at *24.
79
Id. at *24–25.
80
Id. at *26.
81
Id. at *25, *27.
71
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Clause.”82 The court could not, in equity, allow Bart St. III, LLC, to receive
any profit from their circumvention of federal law.83
As explained above, the strict compliance approach is strongly
supported by the existing framework of the CSA and is consistent with the
role of federal courts.84 This seems to provide something close to a ‘brightline rule’ in contract enforcement: if enforcement of the contract would grant
a party to that contract interest in substances prohibited by federal law, then
the court will not enforce the contract.85 The strict compliance approach
would be easier for courts to follow than the nuanced approach because the
sole question is whether enforcement of the contract would grant this illicit
interest. If the answer is yes, then the contract is unenforceable. Otherwise,
the contract would be enforced.
iii. Criticisms of the Strict Compliance Approach
The major problem with this approach is that the federal courts would
be obligated to ignore the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, the recent history
of non-enforcement of cannabis prohibitions, and the inequities that may be
present in each contract situation. Even worse, parties would be able to enter
into cannabis contracts, breach those contracts when it suits them, and have
a federal court rule the contracts unenforceable when the party on the
receiving end of the breach attempts to recover from the breach.86 So long as
the strict compliance approach is followed, the unclean hands doctrine would
allow defendants in breach of contract actions to benefit from undeserved
windfalls.87 There would be no security in the cannabis industry if this
method were adopted across the board.88 While this may be the intent behind
such an approach, it would directly harm the economic, political, and legal
structures of Colorado, California, Washington, and many other states which
have worked to develop consistent and tenable enforcement schemes for their
existing cannabis markets.89 It would also prohibit states like Arizona—
which recently passed the Smart and Safe Act—from enacting policies

82

Id. at *27 (citing United States v. Nixon, 839 F.3d 855, 888 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at *27–28.
84
See Tracy v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-00487, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35913, at *33–34
(D. Haw. Mar. 16, 2012); see also note 51 and accompanying text accompanying.
85
See Bart St., III v. ACC Enters., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00083, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58003, at *26
(D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2020).
86
See Steven Mare, He Who Comes into Court Must Not Come with Green Hands: The Marijuana
Industry’s Ongoing Struggle with the Illegality and Unclean Hands Doctrines, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1351,
1353 (2016).
87
See Marvis, supra note 51, at 975–76. This would be the case even if the defendant in the case
does not bring the unclean hands doctrine as a defense, since courts are permitted to raise the issue
sua sponte. See Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 F.3d 259, 265 (3rd Cir. 2010).
88
See Mare, supra note 86, at 1373 (discussing the difficulties of contract enforcement when federal
judges rule such contracts unenforceable regardless of state law).
89
See Marvis, supra note 51, at 971, 1003.
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designed to institute a proper enforcement mechanism for state cannabis
laws.90 As a result, this approach is untenable.
B. Consideration of the Circumstances in Equity and Public Policy
Another approach is for the federal courts to examine the nuances
behind contract enforcement and determine each case on an individual basis,
contemplating the potential inequitable results from strict enforcement in
a decision based in equity rather than law.91 This approach, referred to in this
Comment as the “Nuanced Approach” and alternatively known as the
“Narrow View” in other articles, allows federal courts to ensure justice is
meted out by preventing companies from operating in uncertain or illegal
markets without risk, allows contracts to be enforced to prevent windfalls or
forfeitures, and reflects the changing landscape in state laws which has tended
towards decriminalization and legality.92
i.

Weakness of the Illegality Defense

A major case supporting the nuanced approach focuses heavily on the
idea that the illegal contract defense is not an absolute safe haven for
litigants.93 Quoting from the court’s decision in Bassidji v. Goe:
Nuanced approaches to the illegal contract defense, taking
into account such considerations as the avoidance of
windfalls or forfeitures, deterrence of illegal conduct, and
relative moral culpability, remain viable in federal court and
represent no departure from Kaiser Steel, but only as long as
the relief ordered does not mandate illegal conduct.94
The general principle established in this case is that the illegal
contract defense will not always be successful where there are
counterbalancing equity interests at play.95 The nuanced approach to contract
enforcement works to prevent inequities, since it looks to other public policy
considerations beyond the illegality defense.96 The principle announced in
Bassidji is used as a basis to not dispose of a case merely on the grounds of
illegality when there are equitable considerations, such as unjust enrichment,
and where enforcement is possible without providing an interest in illegal
substances or activities in violation of federal law.97

90
See Max Savage Levenson, Arizona just legalized marijuana. Here’s what happens next (Nov.
3, 2020), https://www.leafly.com/news/politics/arizona-just-legalized-marijuana-what-happens-next.
91
See Marvis, supra note 51, at 986–87.
92
See id. at 1000–1002.
93
Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 2005).
94
Id. at 937–38.
95
Id. at 932.
96
See id. at 937–38.
97
Id. at 938.
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One of the first cases on cannabis contracts that relied on the
discussion in Bassidji was Mann v. Gullickson.98 The case involved the
defendant defaulting on their promissory note executed pursuant to
an agreement to purchase two businesses from the plaintiff.99 One business
was a consulting business for a state-regulated cannabis dispensary and
cultivation licenses, and the other was a hydroponic retail operation.100
The District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that the
contract was enforceable on the grounds that enforcing the payment of
the note neither required the defendant to possess, cultivate, or distribute
cannabis, nor granted the defendant any interest in a cannabis cultivation
company.101 According to the court, the contract was enforceable because
there were no illegal interests that would contravene state or federal public
policy.102
The nuanced approach would also permit courts to sever illegal
portions of cannabis contracts so long as the intent of the parties is
not frustrated by that removal.103
This concept was employed by
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in
Street v. ACC Enters., LLC, which was decided before their decision
in Bart St., III, the court stated that Nevada law would allow provisions in
a contract to be severed from the contract due to their illegality if those
provisions are collateral to the primary purpose of the transaction, the intent
of the parties in making the contract is preserved, and there is at least one
remedy that the court can provide that is legal under federal or state law. 104
This seems to indicate that states are willing to analyze the intent of the parties
in making a contract and adhere to the principle of freedom of contract by
following that intent rather than abandoning ship and ruling contracts
involving cannabis null and void.105
ii. Preventing Unclean Hands
Another benefit is that the nuanced approach would allow federal
courts to consider the unclean hands doctrine as a factor in providing equitable
recovery in breach cases when the parties to the contract knew about

98

No. 15-cv-03630, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152125, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016).
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *2.
101
Id. at *29.
102
Id. at *34. Rather than assuming the broad view of the strict compliance approach on illegality and
unclean hands, the court in Mann considered the nuance of the remedy sought to determine whether they
could provide a remedy without violating the CSA. Id. at 24–25. So long as they could order a remedy
without violating the CSA, the contract could be enforced. Id. at 25–26.
103
See Street v. ACC Enters., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00083, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167299, at *12
(D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2018).
104
Id. at *11–14.
105
See Bart St., III v. ACC Enters., LLC, No. 2:17–cv-00083, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58003, at *7,
*17–18 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2020).
99
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the potential illegality of their business interests.106 The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado considered unclean hands in Green
Earth Wellness Center v. Atain Specialty Insurance Company.107 Colorado
had been at the forefront of cannabis legalization and decriminalization
efforts, with Amendment 64 having been passed just four years prior to
legalizing recreational cannabis use by adults.108 Because of their early
efforts to legalize and decriminalize cannabis, it makes sense that Colorado
developed a legislative and judicial approach to enforcing cannabis
contracts.109 Part of the Colorado State Constitution even stipulates that
enforcement of cannabis contracts is the public policy of the state.110
Within this framework, the court held that they would not invalidate
the contract in Green Earth Wellness on public policy grounds.111 Since the
parties understood the federal illegality of cannabis and pursued a contractual
relationship involving cannabis anyways, they could not reasonably be
shielded from liability for breach of contract.112 In providing a remedy, the
court deferred to state public policy and enforced the contract on the grounds
that the remedy requested would not require a violation of the CSA.113
The approach has been employed in other district and circuit courts
as well. One case in the Northern District of Texas dealt with issues of unjust
enrichment, with the court finding that enforcement of cannabis contracts
would be appropriate in order to avoid granting unjust enrichment or unearned
windfalls to the parties seeking to not have the contracts enforced.114 Another
decision in the Tenth Circuit dealt with whether employers were obligated to
adhere to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) with respect to overtime
pay for their employees who provided security services for cannabis
businesses.115 That court determined that employers were still obligated to
follow the FLSA even when providing services for a company violating
federal law so long as those employees met all relevant criteria.116
106

Marvis, supra note 51, at 976.
163 F. Supp. 3d 821, 832–34 (D. Colo. 2016).
108
See Matt Ferner, Amendment 64 Passes: Colorado Legalizes Marijuana for Recreational Use,
HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/amendment-64-passes-in-co_n_2079899 (Nov. 20, 2012).
109
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-601.
110
See id.; see also COLO. CONST. art. 18 § 16.
111
163 F. Supp. 3d 821, 835 (2016).
112
Id.
113
See id.
114
See Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2311-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187391, at
*23–24 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) (holding that a motion to dismiss a claim for illegality requires analysis
of factors including the avoidance of forfeitures, avoidance of unjust enrichment, deterrence of illegal
conduct, statutory language declaring contracts unenforceable, and other pros and cons to the enforcement
of the contract).
115
See Kenney v. Helix TCS, Inc., 939 F.3d 1106, 1108 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that a company that
provides security for marijuana and cannabis companies is not exempt from complying with the Fair Labor
Standards Act merely because the company they serve conducts business in contravention to federal law
when allowing such exemptions would permit companies to engage in illegal markets with fewer
requirements).
116
Id. at 1110–11.
107
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iii. Criticisms of the Nuanced Approach
The cases enforcing cannabis contracts provide an equitable
argument as to why the illegality defense is insufficient to defeat enforcement
absent a showing that enforcement would compel violations of the CSA.
However, this approach is also subject to substantial change by the federal
government if the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency,
Attorney General, or President provides guidelines encouraging enforcement
of the CSA. The fact that Attorney General Jeff Sessions was able to rescind
the Cole Memoranda indicates that informal position statements by federal
officers are not enough to properly protect the interests of parties to cannabis
contracts.117
While the nuanced approach seems desirable from a fairness and
equitable perspective, it is nonetheless contrary to controlling federal law.118
The attractiveness of a solution in equity does not create legal validation or
support where there is directly contrary law that federal judges are obligated
to enforce, so the federal courts are reliant on a case-by-case analysis which
may be inconsistent and unreliable.119 This approach seriously threatens the
balance and Separation of Powers provided for by the Constitution since it
would empower the judiciary to employ equitable remedies despite the
dictates of federal law. Therefore, while the nuanced approach seems like
a just and fair method for federal courts to follow, it is plagued by too many
issues that run contrary to the role of such courts for it to be viable or
consistent.
C. Abstention, Divesting Jurisdiction, and Remanding to State Courts
The third option is for federal courts to reject cases even where
jurisdiction exists. This appears to present a nice middle-ground for courts to
avoid the stigma of legislating from the bench, protects the balance of
Separation of Powers between the Legislative and Judicial branches, and
mirrors the uncertainty posed by the current system without having to strike
inconsistent decisions and without threatening the credibility of the courts.
Rejecting jurisdiction over such cases also provides the judiciary with
a persuasive argument that Congress and the states need a resolution on how
to proceed, as federal courts need a better baseline to operate from than easily
undone, unofficial executive memoranda.

117
See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., on Marijuana Enforcement to
U.S. Att’ys, (Jan. 4, 2018) (on file with U.S. Dept. of Just.).
118
Marvis, supra note 51, at 1000.
119
Id. at 977. But see id. at 1003.
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Burford Abstention Reviewed

The primary way for a federal court to not hear a case that they have
proper jurisdiction over is by applying the doctrine of Abstention.120
There are five different doctrines of Abstention, each named after the
Supreme Court decision where they were announced.121 Of these doctrines,
the Burford Abstention doctrine is most related to the issue of cannabis
contract enforcement because the doctrine allows federal courts to reject
matters that are governed by comprehensive state regulations.122
Burford involved the Railroad Commission of Texas granting
an order to Burford to drill oil wells, with the case revolving around the
interpretation of state law.123 The case was before the Supreme Court on
diversity jurisdiction grounds.124 Writing for the plurality, Justice Hugo
Black found that the state court review would be proper since the case
involved state law interpretation rather than federal law interpretation.125 The
general principle that came out of the case allows federal courts to abstain
from hearing cases validly presented to them under diversity jurisdiction
when state courts have more expertise in a complex and unique area of state
law that is particularly significant to that state.126 This doctrine has been
applied in two cases involving cannabis: Big Sky Sci. LLC, v. Bennetts in the
Ninth Circuit and Left Coast Ventures Inc. v. Bill’s Nursery Inc. in the
Western District of Washington.127
ii. Abstention in Big Sky
In the case of Big Sky Sci. LLC, v. Bennetts, the Ninth Circuit dealt
with the seizure of hemp being transported through Idaho.128 The case had
originally gone through the District Court for the District of Idaho, which
refused to abstain from the case and subsequently denied plaintiff Big Sky
120
See generally Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power of
the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811 (1991).
121
See generally R.R. Comm. of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315 (1943); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
122
Massey, supra note 120, at 832. Younger abstention requires there to be pending state cases
occurring simultaneously as the federal case. Id. However, this limitation applies to state criminal cases
or state civil cases which are similar in kind to criminal proceedings. See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in
the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283, 2287 (2018). Pullman abstention requires a delay in
federal proceedings while state courts clarify state law to avoid constitutional issues. Massey, supra note
120, at 832. Thibodaux abstention is largely similar to Burford abstention, to such a degree that it is treated
as “a specific application of Burford abstention.” Id. (footnote omitted). Colorado River abstention allows
deference to duplicative state court cases where the need for abstention is “exceptional.” Id. at 833.
123
Burford, 319 U.S. at 316–17.
124
Id. at 317.
125
Id. at 334.
126
Id.
127
See generally Big Sky Sci., LLC, v. Bennetts, 776 F.App'x 541 (9th Cir. 2019); Left Coast
Ventures, Inc. v. Bill's Nursery Inc., No. C19-1297, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210736 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 6, 2019).
128
Bennetts, 776 F.App'x at 541.
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Scientific’s motion for a preliminary injunction.129 The issue before the
Ninth Circuit was whether the District of Idaho had abused its discretion by
not abstaining from ruling on the case when there was an in rem forfeiture
action pending in Idaho state court that could have provided a forum for the
presentation of federal law issues.130
The Ninth Circuit applied a version of the abstention doctrine test set
forth in Younger v. Harris, which requires that “(1) there is ‘an ongoing state
judicial proceeding’; (2) the proceeding ‘implicates important state interests’;
(3) there is ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise
constitutional challenges’; and (4) the requested relief ‘seeks to enjoin’ or has
‘the practical effect of enjoining’ the ongoing state judicial proceeding.”131
Using this test, the Ninth Circuit found that it was improper for the District of
Idaho not to apply the Younger Abstention doctrine on the grounds that there
was an in rem forfeiture action pending in state court, there were legitimate
state interests in having the case resolved in that court, there was sufficient
opportunity for Big Sky to present their federal claims in the state proceeding,
and a decision by the federal court would result in a practical enjoinder of the
state issue.132 However, the issue with applying this doctrine to other cases is
that there may not be a pending state court case justifying Abstention.
Younger abstention would also be inappropriate for cannabis contract disputes
because it runs contrary to the idea of Burford abstention. State courts attempt
to reinforce existing policies regarding cannabis contract disputes, so it is
unlikely that a state proceeding would provide insufficient or inadequate
redress for injuries suffered as a result of a breach of contract.133
iii. Abstention in Left Coast Ventures
The case of Left Coast Ventures Inc. v. Bill’s Nursery Inc had
substantially more to do with cannabis contract enforcement than Big Sky.
This case involved two parties that had a contract to prepare applications for
medical cannabis licenses in Florida after the passage of the Compassionate
Medical Cannabis Act.134 There were five available licenses for companies
to apply for which, if granted, would allow those businesses to grow and
provide cannabis for qualifying medical patients in the state.135
After reapplying and partnering with the Department of Health,
Bill’s Nursery was awarded the license.136
129

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018)).
132
Id.
133
See Smith, Jr., supra note 122, at 2293.
134
Left Coast Ventures, Inc. v. Bill’s Nursery Inc., No. C19-1297, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210736, at
*1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 2019).
135
Id. at *1–2.
136
Id. at *3.
130
131
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Part of the contract between Left Coast—who took over as the
assignee for the original contract between Bill’s Nursery and Privateer
Holdings—and Bill’s Nursery granted the former a right to purchase the
latter’s stock without any encumbrances.137 When Bill’s Nursery ultimately
received the license, Left Coast filed suit to exercise their option to receive
a share of the license.138 The contract included a choice of law provision
requiring claims arising out of the contract to be filed in a state or federal
court in Washington.139 Further, the provision required that Washington law
be used to govern and construe any provisions of the contract.140 The case
was initially filed in the state court, but Bill’s Nursery filed to remove it to
federal court.141
When it went before the District Court for the Western District of
Washington, the court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring the parties to
plead why the case should not be dismissed when it appeared that it would
require them to rule on a remedy granting ownership interests in a cannabis
business in violation of the CSA.142 Bill’s Nursery requested that the contract
be ruled unenforceable because it violated the CSA, and Left Coast argued
that the cause of action should not be dismissed because the contract could be
enforced without violating the CSA, and there was substantial public policy
supporting the enforcement of the agreement.143 Left Coast also requested
that the court adopt the Abstention doctrine and push the case back to state
court due to the state’s interest in adjudicating the issue.144
When considering whether to apply a doctrine of Abstention, the
court explained that it would be necessary to employ their discretion to fit the
narrow and specific limits of whichever doctrine they found suitable.145
The district court determined that the Burford Abstention doctrine was the
most appropriate doctrine to follow, given the circumstances.146 Under this
doctrine, the court had to assess whether there were difficult issues of state
law “bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.”147 Such Abstention
would be justified where (a) the federal issues of the case cannot easily be
separated from complicated issues of state law which require the competence
of state courts to address and (b) involvement by the federal court would
prevent the state from properly developing coherent policies of
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
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enforcement.148
Though the Burford Abstention doctrine considers
an additional factor, the court found that the presence of the prior two factors
was sufficient to establish a basis for applying the doctrine.149
The court ultimately determined that they could properly abstain from
hearing the case because it dealt with an apparent conflict between Florida
law and the CSA.150 This conflict in laws was improper for the court to
review, especially given the interests of the state of Florida to develop
a consistent policy of medical cannabis enforcement.151 The court felt that
the illegality defense presented by Bill’s Nursery would disincentivize
businesses from complying with state cannabis laws.152 Companies could
enter into agreements with other companies involving an interest in cannabis
processing or cultivation in violation of the CSA and simply remove the issue
to federal court whenever it was available, thus providing “an absolute
defense to private contract claims.”153 Because the court found that this
outcome was inconsistent with the objectives of the Washington legislature
to establish a coherent cannabis policy, the court abstained from hearing the
case and remanded it to the King County Superior Court.154
D. Federal Courts Should Reject Jurisdiction to Secure
Separation of Powers, Supremacy of Federal Law, and
the Nuances of Cannabis Law
In order to reconcile the possibility of federal enforcement or nonenforcement of the CSA with the business interests of executing valid
cannabis contracts, companies involved with such contracts should recognize
the lack of federal support for enforcement.155 When considering whether to
participate in business ventures involving interests in cannabis companies,
there should be a more clearly defined, predictable expectation than what is
currently available.156
Judges in the federal district and circuit courts have an obligation to
adhere to and enforce federal law, and it is clear that federal law prohibits the
enforcement of illegal contracts generally.157 At the same time, it is unclear
how the Separation of powers doctrine has been impacted by the
148

Id. at *5–6.
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inconsistency in enforcement and judicial action.158 Strict adherence to the
CSA and principles of federal supremacy and the illegality doctrine will result
in inequitable outcomes that encourage businesses to enter into—and
breach—contracts involving cannabis because of the lack of accountability.159
Non-adherence to the CSA alongside a nuanced approach to each contract on
a case-by-case basis ignored the role of the federal court system in enforcing
and interpreting federal law, thus allowing for results that would not be
supported as a matter of law despite their apparent equity.
As a result, it would be in the best interests of federal courts to reject
jurisdiction over cannabis contracts that may or may not involve parties
developing an interest in the cultivation or profits of a cannabis business until
Congress and the Executive Branch develop a more consistent approach to
CSA enforcement and illegality. Pushing these cases back down to state
courts that have valid jurisdiction allows for a more consistent and predictable
approach to contract enforcement issues since many of the states in which
cannabis contracts are formed and operate have already codified their
approach to subsequent enforcement.160
While this Comment advocates for the implementation of the
Abstention doctrine, it is appropriate to mention the difficulty of
implementing such an approach. One substantial downside to this approach
is that federal courts rarely abstain from hearing a case under the current
abstention doctrines.161 As explained in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): “If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”162 This has been applied in cases
within the Ninth Circuit, requiring federal courts to reject jurisdiction over
cases that they believe were improperly removed.163
Companies that operate in different states and who contract for
significant monetary value will often be able to bring actions to federal courts
under diversity jurisdiction.164 This will often be the primary grounds for
removal to federal court in cannabis contract disputes since the other route of
federal question jurisdiction is unlikely to be present.165 So long as this
158
See generally Sam Kamin, “You’ve Always Had the Power.” Marijuana, Federalism, and
Separation of Powers, AM. CONST. SOC’ Y (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/youvealways-had-the-power-marijuana-federalism- and-separation-of-powers/.
159
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SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITT LLP (May 21, 2020), https://www.thsh.com/cannabizdisputes/california-stateappeals-court-focuses-on-illegality-at-time-of-contract-to-dismiss-commercial-cannabis-dispute.
160
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See Beth Shankle Anderson, Our Federalism–The Younger Abstention Doctrine, 81 FL. BAR. J. 8,
8 n.17 (2007).
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Walker v. Gunn, 511 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1975).
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jurisdiction is properly vested in the federal courts and there is no question as
to the legitimacy of the removal from state court, the doctrine of Abstention
will appear unviable.166 Additionally, applying the Abstention doctrine,
regardless of the specific form taken but especially with the
Burford Abstention doctrine, does not mean that the particular issue will
avoid federal courts entirely.167 Abstention merely allows a state court to
resolve the issue without prejudice from the federal court.168 Lastly, review
of an issue under the Burford Abstention by the U.S. Supreme Court may not
be possible where there exists federal diversity jurisdiction as opposed to
federal question jurisdiction.169
However, the imperfection in the abstention doctrine is not
a sufficient reason to abandon its proper application when federal review
would disrupt the ability of state legislatures to develop consistent
methodologies of cannabis contract enforcement. The Supreme Court
explained that the doctrine of Abstention would be proper and appropriate to
either avoid a premature resolution of a constitutional issue or protect the
balance between federal and state laws.170
As explained above, there are substantial difficulties in properly
employing either the strict compliance approach or the nuanced approach.
While the application of the abstention doctrine would not completely resolve
the issues present with federal courts and their responsibilities to rule on
cannabis enforcement actions, it strikes a fair balance between protecting the
integrity of the federal court system and Congress’s authority to pass laws by
following the CSA on one hand and allowing state courts to properly consider
the circumstances of each contract action to provide equitable outcomes on
the other.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the laws regarding cannabis continue to change over time, it is
important for courts to have proper methods of cannabis contract
enforcement. This holds true for both state and federal courts. Critically, the
capability of private businesses to enter into interstate commercial
interactions with other businesses implicates the need for federal courts to be

166
Although rarely adhered to due to its antiquity and the myriad of jurisdictional exceptions
developed to encourage judicial efficiency, Chief Justice John Marshall’s heavy discouragement of courts
declining their valid jurisdiction in Cohens v. Virginia serves as a constant reminder of the role of federal
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167
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(2013).
168
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N.J Sup. Ct., 409 U.S. 467, 469 (1973).
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Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965)).
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prepared to approach contract enforcement actions when they appear under
diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
Congress has entertained several pieces of legislation that would
decriminalize, legalize, or reschedule cannabis, opting not to pass any such
legislation over the fifty-year history of the CSA.171 Until such a change
occurs, there will be a strong impetus for federal courts to abide by
preemption principles, respect the doctrine of Separation of Powers, and rule
cannabis contracts unenforceable on the grounds of illegality under the
CSA.172 Despite this impetus, following a strict model of adherence is likely
to produce a litany of inequitable outcomes, even if the law itself is clear on
how federal courts should proceed.173
Especially given the increasingly complex nature of state laws
regarding cannabis, federal courts are opting to follow a more nuanced
approach to enforcement by considering equitable conditions such as unjust
enrichment and unclean hands.174 This approach accorded more deference to
state law, and it mirrors the general approach to enforcement adopted by
federal agencies in the years since the Cole Memorandum.175 Particularly in
the Ninth Circuit, this approach has been employed with favorable results for
some litigators.176 However, this approach does not have a basis for support
in the role of federal courts or existing federal law.177 Until the CSA is
amended to either reschedule cannabis or remove it entirely, this nuanced
approach will be contrary to the law.
Because of the weaknesses of employing the strict compliance
approach and the nuanced approach, federal courts must rely on some other
methodology for consistently ruling on contract enforcement actions that
present valid jurisdiction. Depending on the circumstances of the case, it
would be valuable for these courts to employ Burford Abstention and send
cannabis contract enforcement actions back to state courts.178 This method
defers to state courts that have more experience and skill at handling such
actions, allows state legislatures to develop consistent enforcement schemes,
secures the Separation of Powers by having federal courts rule on issues that
implicate legislative or executive action, and does not require violation of the
171
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CSA by keeping federal courts out of the conflict between federal and state
law.
The use of the Burford Abstention is beneficial for the courts that
employ it since it avoids the potential for constitutional issues or applications
of contrary law.179 While Abstention may frustrate valid federal jurisdiction
and impose unexpected challenges on private contracts that specify federal
court forum selection clauses, these frustrations are counterbalanced by state
policies that promote consistency and equity.180 Although it may not be
a popular method for dealing with controversial cases, federal courts should
look to abstain from cannabis contract enforcement actions until a clearer
legislative and enforcement policy is adopted consistent with existing state
law trends.

179
See Left Coast Ventures Inc. v. Bill’s Nursery Inc., No. C19-1297, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210736,
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180
See generally Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).

Published by eCommons, 2022

